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I. INTRODUCTION
Members of armed forces are sent off to war to kill enemy combatants.
They are not sent off to kill civilians. Nonetheless, modern wars invariably
result in far more civilian deaths than military deaths.1 This Article
examines the collateral damage rule,2 one of the central operational rules
regulating the conduct of hostilities, that essentially permits civilian
casualties only when they are incidental to an attack on a legitimate military
target. The rule is explored in light of the changing nature of warfare over
the last two centuries including the shifting ratios of military to civilian warrelated deaths. The Article ultimately questions the continuing validity of
this rule when, in recent decades, the overall statistics for war-related deaths
reveal that civilian fatalities are considerably greater than military deaths.
The collateral damage rule, also known as the proportionality rule, is
meant to offer protection to civilians in wartime and to give content to the
principle of distinction in contexts where military and civilian targets are
interwoven.3 That statement reflects the usual assessment of the collateral
damage rule but this Article asks whether that assessment simply tricks us
into thinking that ethical military advisors, by following the rule, will in fact
avoid all but incidental damage to civilians. If the many and varied studies
on the ratios of civilian to military war-related deaths reveal disproportionate
civilian deaths (as they do) and if the many and varied epidemiological
studies reveal war-related civilian displacement, disease, deprivation, and
famine (as they do), the Article asks whether the collateral damage rule has
become simply an organized deceit to persuade us that condoning the
combatant’s privilege (permitting solders to kill enemy combatants)4 is not
signing the death warrant for civilians, except “incidentally.” The Article
argues that in the context of modern warfare, the collateral damage rule can
never accomplish what it purports to do, except in the most temporally
restricted sense. It then explores what should be the fate of a legal rule that
is central to the laws of armed conflict and cannot, by the nature of the
context in which the rule is operative, be effective.

1

See infra Part III and notes 54–124.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), art. 51, ¶ 5(b), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API].
3
See JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
93–94 (2004) (highlighting the definition of an indiscriminate attack and explaining the
relationship between the prohibition on such attacks and the requirement of proportionality).
4
GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
WAR 41–42 (2010).
2
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Trying to determine when there is sufficient armed violence to constitute
armed conflict or war is difficult and varies depending on what is being
studied. Classifying the different types of armed conflict is controversial and
changes depending on the focus of the research. Quantifying military and
civilian deaths in armed conflict presents multiple classification problems
and much disputed or unavailable data.5 Nonetheless, despite all of these
difficulties, it has become possible to discern significant trends within the
last two centuries. Part II of this Article examines the changes that have
taken place, over roughly the last two centuries, regarding the types of wars
that occur. Part III focuses on the shifting ratio of military to civilian warrelated deaths during this period, noting that we now live in an era where
wars result in a hugely disproportionate loss of civilian lives. Part IV traces
the history and applicability of the collateral damage rule, also known as the
proportionality rule. Part V brings together the data on the changes in the
types of wars fought and the shift from mainly military to mainly civilian
war-related deaths. Part V further asks what continuing regulatory effect the
collateral damage rule can be expected to exert when the data on war-related
deaths inevitably indicates that the rule has utterly failed to achieve its
purpose. Part VI makes a few modest suggestions that may, in some
measure, help fulfill the purpose of the collateral damage rule.
II. THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE
A. The Threshold of War/Armed Conflict
Characterizing different types of armed conflict is difficult and different
authors have taken somewhat different approaches. First, there is the
question of which armed conflicts are sufficiently serious to be taken out of
the category of “internal disturbances and tensions”6 and placed into the
category of armed conflict. Picking which armed conflicts merit study will
often depend upon the issues being researched. Many authors choose a
certain level of deaths in armed conflict per year to qualify for inclusion in
statistical data. For example, in their seminal book, Resort to War, Meredith
Reid Sarkees and Frank Whelon Wayman use the standard of conflict that
produces “1,000 [battle-related] deaths per year (or twelve month period).”7
5

See infra Part III.B.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 1, ¶¶ 1–2, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter APII].
7
MEREDITH REID SARKEES & FRANK WHELON WAYMAN, RESORT TO WAR: A DATA GUIDE
TO INTER-STATE, EXTRA-STATE, INTRA-STATE, AND NON-STATE WARS, 1816–2007, at 61
6
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This was the war typology used by Singer and Small in two earlier studies,8
and is also used by authors such as R.J. Rummel9 and many others.10 It
should be noted here that this typology does not address the issue of when
international humanitarian law becomes applicable either to international
armed conflict—also called inter-state armed conflict—or to noninternational armed conflict. That very different question is answered by
examining the language of the Four Geneva Conventions: Common Article 2
(inter-state wars and occupation); Common Article 3 (conflict not of an
international character); Additional Protocol I, Article 1 (inter-state wars, but
including fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist
regimes when exercising their right of self-determination); Additional
Protocol II, Article 1 (internal armed conflicts: “Conflicts . . . which take
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups” that meet
certain conditions).11 Before discussing classifications of warfare, it should
be noted that there is extensive literature on this issue, largely engaged in by
political scientists. The categories discussed below are intended to be broadbrush categories as the overall purpose of this Article is not to support or
attack any particular categorization of warfare, but rather to examine the
overall changing nature of combat, particularly as it relates to the collateral
damage rule.
(2010).
8
J. DAVID SINGER & MELVIN SMALL, THE WAGES OF WAR, 1816–1965: A STATISTICAL
HANDBOOK 32, 38–39 (1972); MELVIN SMALL & J. DAVID SINGER, RESORT TO ARMS:
INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL WAR, 1816–1980, at 46–50 (1982). These studies were part of the
Correlates of War Project originally established at the University of Michigan in 1963 and
now carried out at various U.S. universities. Correlates of War, History, COW, http://www.
correlatesofwar/cowhistory.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2013); Correlates of War, Ongoing
Research, COW, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ongoing.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
9
E.g., R.J. Rummel, Democracies are Less Warlike than Other Regimes, 1 EUR. J. INT’L
REL. 457 (1995) (examining core studies related to war data, including those by Singer and
Small).
10
E.g., Jack S. Levy, Thomas C. Walker & Martin S. Edwards, Continuity and Change in
the Evolution of Warfare, in WAR IN A CHANGING WORLD (Zeev Maoz & Azar Gat eds.,
2001). Other compilations have much lower thresholds, e.g., twenty-five annual battle deaths
as adopted by Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset, 39 J.
PEACE RES. 615, 617 (2002).
11
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter GI]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GII]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GIII]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 2–3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; API, supra note 2, art. 1; APII, supra note 6, art. 1.
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B. Categorizing Types of Armed Conflict
Using the “1,000 [battled—related] deaths per year” typology,12 wars can
be characterized in a number of ways depending upon the particular focus of
study. Law categorizes armed conflict into inter-state or international armed
conflict (IAC) and non-international armed conflict taking place within a
state. Because a number of changes have taken place in the international
community, including the creation of a wider variety of entities with the
capacity to wage war, a more nuanced categorization of armed conflict is
necessary in order to grasp the extent of the changing nature of armed
conflict. The typologies discussed below largely, but not entirely, follow the
categories used by Sarkees and Wayman.
1. Interstate Armed Conflict
For the purposes of this Article, interstate armed conflicts are those that
include state participants on both sides of the battle. Although a conflict may
involve multiple parties, this Article does not seek to include or exclude such
conflict on the basis of troops committed or killed,13 provided that the overall
battle-related deaths in the conflict amount to at least 1,000 and that most of
the fighting is carried out by state entities. Non-state entities, such as
colonies, non-autonomous territories, and organized armed groups may well
take part in such conflicts, but the state entities must be engaged in the bulk
of combat activities.14
2. Armed Conflict by States Against Overseas Non-State Entities
There are two types of conflict with overseas non-state entities. In the
first type, a state engages in armed conflict with a dependent entity situated
outside the state’s territorial boundaries, such as a colony, protectorate,
special territory, mandate territory, or dependency.15 Frequently these
12

SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 7.
States are sometimes qualified as war participants if they meet either of the following
thresholds: 100 fatalities or 1,000 troops in active combat roles. Id.
14
Id. at 61–62.
15
Examples include the French/Algerian War (1954–1962), which led to Algerian
independence from France; The Franco-Vietnamese War (1946–1954), which led to the
withdrawal of France from Vietnam and the partition of Vietnam into North Vietnam and
South Vietnam. See generally Raphaelle Branche, Torture and Other Violations of the Law
by the French Army During the Algerian War, in GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES & THE WEST:
HISTORY AND COMPLICITY 134 (Adam Jones ed., 2004); YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR
CRIMES AND TORTURE: FRENCH JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND
COMMISSIONS (1940–2005), at 61–77 (2006) (providing a brief history of the Franco13
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conflicts will involve combat designed either to curb or to achieve
independence from the controlling state.16 The second type of conflict
involving non-state entities arises when a state is engaged in combat against
a non-state entity, such as Al Qaeda, where that entity has not been under the
power or control of the state party to the conflict.17 In this context, the aims
of the non-state entity may well include preventing the state participant from
wielding military or other economic power in certain parts of the globe but
does not focus on gaining political statehood for itself. Authorities, such as
Sarkees and Wayman, describe this type of conflict as “extra-state war.”18
3. Internal Armed Conflict
Internal armed conflicts, also known as non-international armed conflicts
(NIAC), occur within the boundaries of a particular state. There are various
types of these conflicts. One is a civil war in which an established state
government’s armed forces are fighting against an organized group or groups
within the state’s territory when such groups are capable of sustained
military activity.19 The requirement that the non-state entity should be
capable of sustained military activity is used principally to distinguish
sustained military activities from short-lived outbursts of violence such as
sudden massacres or sporadic riots where the death toll may well be more
than 1,000 but there is no systematic organization within or between the
attacking groups.20 Additional Protocol II, which applies to NIAC, includes
an organizational requirement as part of its first article, explaining when the
Protocol is applicable:
This Protocol . . . [applies] to all armed conflicts . . . which take
place in the territory of the High Contracting Party between its
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise
such control over part of its territory as to enable them to carry

Vietnamese War and international response).
16
SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 7, at 193.
17
See id. at 63. Since the September 11, 2001 bombings in the U.S. by Al Qaeda—a nonstate, Sunni Muslim, paramilitary, international organization—the United States has
systematically attacked Al Qaeda targets.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 65–66. Difficult issues can arise when civil wars result in power shifts, such as
when an existing government is largely ousted from power by a rebel group and some
members of the international community recognize the rebels as the new government while
others continue to support the earlier government.
20
Id.
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out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this Protocol.21
Other forms of internal armed conflict occur within a state when different
non-state entities fight each other but are not engaged in combat against the
central government. Sometimes a regional or substate government may be
engaged in combat with rebel groups; sometimes none of the fighting entities
will be connected with any governing authority.22
C. Transnational and National Conflicts and Their Transmutation
Inter-state armed conflict will, of course, take place between at least two
states and possibly more, but where non-state entities are involved the exact
nature of the conflict may be called into question. Where rebel groups are
fighting a central or substate government, the combat is likely to be
contained within the territory of a particular state, although sympathizers
from other states may join the fight.23 Non-state armed groups may carry on
armed activities in a number of different states simultaneously; their combat
activities may be directed against state entities or against other non-state
groups.24
Armed conflict categories are seldom static. Conflict can start out in one
category of combat and change over time into another category. The
category of conflict may change several times during the course of a war.
Fighting in one part of a state’s territory may be designated as a particular
category of conflict while fighting in another part of the state’s territory is
categorized differently. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
21
APII, supra note 6, art. 1, ¶ 1. However, Additional Protocol I—the title of which states
that it relates to “the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict”—states that it
also applies to certain forms of internal conflict:
[A]rmed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right
of self-determination . . . .
API, supra note 2, art. 1, ¶ 4.
This requirement for application of Protocol I, unlike the similar section in Protocol II,
does not demand any particular level of organization other than a declaration of purpose
within the scope of the above definition. This would only require some level of
communication sufficient to pursue the purpose.
22
SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 7, at 485. For a list of all wars by classification, see id.
at 579–94.
23
Id. at 337–40 (noting the shrinking distinction between activities in inter-state and intrastate conflict, explaining civil wars generally, and describing the consequences of external
intervention).
24
Id. at 485; see also id. at 46 tbl.2.1 (listing COW war typologies including those for nonstate wars).
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Yugoslavia has noted this mutability phenomenon in Prosecutor v. Duško
Tadić:
It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it
takes place between two or more States. In addition, in case of
an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a
State, it may become international (or, depending upon the
circumstances, be international in character alongside an
internal armed conflict) if (i) another State intervenes in that
conflict through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the
participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that
other State.25
Indeed, in the Tadić case, the Tribunal devotes a whole section—running
to fifty-seven paragraphs over twenty-six pages—to “The Legal Criteria for
Establishing When, in an Armed Conflict Which is Prima Facie Internal,
Armed Forces May be Regarded as Acting On Behalf of a Foreign Power,
Thereby Rendering the Conflict International.”26 The Tribunal also noted the
disagreement that has arisen between itself and the International Court of
Justice on certain issues regarding classification of armed conflict.27 The fact
that armed conflicts can change from internal to international and back again,
or can have both types of conflict operating alongside each other, obviously
complicates the compilation of data on war classification.
D. The Changing Prevalence of the Types of Armed Conflict
There are many studies on the prevalence of armed conflict stretching
over the last two hundred years. Sarkees and Wayman’s study in Resort to
War: 1816–2007 is perhaps the most comprehensive and current and this
section of the Article relies heavily on their data.28

25

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 84 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
26
Id. § 3.
27
Id. ¶¶ 115–145 (discussing the effective control test found in Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits) 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 109, 115 (June
27)).
28
SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 7.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013 11:44 AM

316

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:307

1. The Prevalence of Inter-state Armed Conflicts
Sarkees and Wayman report that “[i]nter-state wars are relatively rare,
with only ninety-five inter-state wars over the past 192 years.”29 The data
also reveals that the early years of the nineteenth century were relatively
peaceful for this category of war. This might be explained by the low
number of states at the time except for the fact that several succeeding
decades (1847–1856; 1857–1866; 1877–1886) experienced a marked rise in
the onset of inter-state wars although the number of states had not risen
significantly.30
Beginning with the decade 1897–1906, the figures indicate that each
decade experienced at least five onsets of inter-state war.31 Three decades
log the highest number of inter-state war onsets with 1857–1866 having the
greatest number, followed by 1967–1976, and then by 1977–1986.32 For the
last two decades studied, 1987–1996 and 1997–2006, the number of interstate war onsets have logged in at five per decade, which equals the overall
average for the entire period studied.33 One further point of interest:
American, Canadian, and European scholars are sometimes (rightly) berated
for their Eurocentric outlook.34 It is salient to note, therefore, that Sarkees
and Wayman have undertaken a global study and the area of the world with
the greatest number of inter-state wars for the period studied is Asia,
followed by Europe and the Middle East.35
2. The Prevalence of Extra-territorial Armed Conflicts by States Against
Non-State Entities
Wars that take place between a state and a non-state entity largely outside
the territory of the state are “much more common than inter-state wars, with
163 . . . [such] wars, compared with 95 inter-state wars . . . between 1816 and
2007. Even so, . . . [such] wars do not occur that frequently.”36 Because
these wars are fought between states and non-state entities, study figures are

29

Id. at 188.
Id. at 188–91.
31
Id. at 190 fig.3.3.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See id. at 45 (explaining that Sarkees and Wayman took an uncommonly expansive
methodological approach to move beyond the perception of Eurocentricity evident in prior
studies).
35
Id. at 190 fig.3.4.
36
Id. at 333 (referring to these wars as “extra-state wars”).
30
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necessarily tied to the number of state and non-state entities with the capacity
for combat.
In the decades when colonies were seeking independence the incidence of
these wars rose, as it has more recently with the increase of international
para-military organizations such as Al Qaeda.37 There was a high incidence
of state versus non-state wars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries when the imperial powers were fighting indigenous peoples in
order to establish colonies.38 The incidence of these wars rose again in the
decade from 1947–1956 which saw the start of the colonial struggle for
independence.39 After that time, the colonial powers, realizing that colonial
independence was a foregone conclusion, seldom resorted to war to retain a
colony. Asia is again the area of the world that has experienced the highest
incidence of this type of armed conflict.40
3. The Prevalence of Internal Armed Conflicts
Sarkees and Wayman catalogue 335 internal armed conflicts during the
period studied (1816–2007); that is more than three times the number of
inter-state wars and more than double the number of extra-territorial state
versus non-state wars in the same period.41 Excluded from this number are
another sixty-two wars that are labeled “non-state wars.”42 These are wars
that take place between non-state entities either in territory not yet under the
control of a state (61 wars) or that take place across state borders (1 war).43
If we combine all of these wars into the broader category of internal armed
conflicts, obviously, the numbers rise even higher. However, excluding the
latter sixty-two wars, the great increase in internal armed conflict begins
during the 1957–1966 decade and keeps rising until the last decade studied
1997–2006, which saw a modest decline from the highest incidence.44 Many
of these internal armed conflicts became internationalized in the sense that
one or more states ultimately intervened in the conflict.45
Looking at the figures for the sixty-two wars that are categorized as
between non-state entities taking place either in a non-state territory or across
37

Id. at 335 fig.4.3.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 336.
41
Id. at 337. Sarkees and Wayman list 103 inter-state wars and mention 163 extraterritorial wars. Id. at 76–77 tbl.3.1, 194.
42
Id. at 485.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 483 fig.5.3.
45
Id.
38
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state borders, the greatest prevalence occurs during the nineteenth century in
what Sarkees and Wayman refer to as the “prestate-formation” period.46
Given their definition of this category of wars, this terminology is not
surprising. Africa, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere have experienced by
far the greatest incidence of these sixty-two wars.47 Again, this is
unsurprising given the history of colonialism and state formation.
4. Conclusions on the Prevalence of Types of Armed Conflicts
From the categories of armed conflict and the data discussed above, it is
easy to discern that during the last two centuries, inter-state wars are the least
prevalent (95); state versus non-state entities are at the mid-prevalence level
(163); and internal armed conflicts top the prevalence chart (335 plus another
62, totaling 397). It is also clear that the incidence of internal armed
conflicts has seen a dramatic rise since the middle of the twentieth century.
In any decade during the last two centuries, the maximum number of
inter-state wars is ten.48 For extra-territorial wars between states and nonstate entities, the maximum number of wars in any decade is eighteen, with a
very marked decline after 1956—five being the maximum number for any
decade since then.49 For internal armed conflicts, the pattern is wholly
different. The second half of the twentieth century saw a dramatic rise in
such wars. From 1957 on, every decade has seen more than twenty internal
armed conflict wars, with forty internal armed conflicts during 1987–1996
and thirty-five during 1997–2006.50 As Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter
Gleditsch note in an updated global combat dataset, there are “declining
numbers of major interstate conflicts and internationalised[sic] civil
wars . . . . [and] most warfare is in the form of civil conflict and wars of state
failure.”51 The Human Security Report 2009/2010 comes to the same
conclusion:
The overwhelming majority of armed conflicts are now fought
within states. These intrastate conflicts have relatively low
annual battle-death tolls on average and have made up an
increasing proportion of all conflicts since the end of World

46

Id. at 537.
Id. at 540 fig.6.4.
48
Id. at 190 fig.3.3.
49
Id. at 335 fig.4.3.
50
Id. at 483 fig.5.3.
51
Bethany Lacina & Nils Petter Gleditsch, Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New
Dataset of Battle Deaths, 21 EUR. J. POPULATION 145, 160 (2005).
47
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War II. In the late 1940s, they made up little over half of all
conflicts; by the early 1990s, their share was closer to 90
percent.52
However, that report also notes that: “[w]ith very few exceptions,
international conflicts have been far more deadly than intrastate conflicts.”53
III. THE SHIFTING RATIO OF MILITARY TO CIVILIAN WAR-RELATED
DEATHS
A. Introduction
In a 2001 study sponsored by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) the authors make the following assessment of the ratio of
military to civilian deaths in modern wars:
The research reveals, in essence, that modern wars have
become conflicts without limits.
Civilians have—both
intentionally and by accident—been moved to center stage in
the theater of war, which was once fought primarily on
battlefields. This fundamental shift in the character of war is
illustrated by a stark statistic: in World War I, nine soldiers
were killed for every civilian life lost. In today’s wars, it is
estimated that ten civilians die for every soldier or fighter
killed in battle.54
There have been several rigorous critiques of the accuracy of this ratio,
which will be discussed below, but it55 is this shift in the ratio of military to
civilian war-related deaths that is the primary focus of this section of the
Article.

52

HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2009/2010, at 160 (2011)
[hereinafter HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT]; see also KALEVI J. HOLSTI, THE STATE,
WAR, AND THE STATE OF WAR (1996), available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-securityreports/20092010/text.aspx (detailing the growing number of intra-state wars from 1945 to
1995).
53
Human Security Report Project, supra note 52, at 22 fig.1.2.
54
Stanley B. Greenberg & Robert O. Boorstin, People On War: Civilians in the Line of
Fire, PUB. PERSP., Nov./Dec. 2001, at 18, 19.
55
See infra Part III.C.3.b.i.
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B. Problems with Compiling Data on War-Related Casualties
This Article claims no in-depth knowledge of statistics and does not seek
to endorse any particular method of compiling data on war-related casualties.
There are many articles that assess various statistical models used for this
task.56 Each compilation tends to be idiosyncratic57 and often rely, to some
extent, on data supplied by non-impartial parties to the conflicts, such as
opposing military forces. The estimates of military and civilian deaths can
vary widely. Some studies provide figures compiled from various databases
and then estimate average or median numbers.58 Even with careful
explanations and limiting provisos, it remains true that “such figures at times
display enormous variance.”59 Nonetheless, through examining a variety of
available reports on war casualties, broad trends are observable over time. It
is these trends, discussed below, that are relevant to the argument pursued in
this Article.
C. War-Related Casualties
1. U.S. Military Deaths
An examination of U.S. military deaths is instructive. In 2010, the U.S.
Congressional Research Service issued a compilation of United States
military war-related deaths and injuries beginning with the Revolutionary
War (1775–1783) and ending with the most recent Iraq War—named
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—and Afghan War—named Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF).60 The highest totals for U.S. military deaths, in
declining order, occurred during World War II (WWII): 405,399; The Civil
War (Union forces only): 364,511; World War I (WWI): 116,516; the

56
See, e.g., Beth Osborne Daponte, Wartime Estimates of Iraqi Civilian Casualties, 89
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 943 (2007) (examining multiple approaches to estimate civilian
casualties for the conflict in Iraq and comparing challenges raised by these approaches).
57
By idiosyncratic I mean that a study covers statistics of one or more particular wars in a
specified time frame or geographic area. The studies also differ on exactly which types of
deaths are included in the data.
58
See, e.g., Matthew White, Death Tolls for the Majors Wars and Atrocities of the
Twentieth Century, NECROMETRICS, http://necrometrics.com/20c1m.htm (last updated June
2011).
59
MILTON LEITENBERG, DEATHS IN WARS AND CONFLICTS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 3 (3d ed.
2006), available at http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20060800_cdsp_occ_leitenb
erg.pdf.
60
ANNE LELAND & MARI-JANA “M-J” OBOROCEANU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32492,
AMERICAN WAR AND MILITARY OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: LISTS AND STATISTICS (2010).
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Vietnam Conflict: 58,220; and the Korean War: 36,574.61 The more recent
U.S. wars have seen far fewer U.S. military deaths ranging from 4,365 in the
Iraq War62 to 1,948 deaths in the Persian Gulf War63 and 973 in the Afghan
War (through February 6, 2010).64 Of course, if Confederate Army deaths
are included in the statistics (estimates range from roughly 258,000 to
roughly 289,000),65 the Civil War would have the highest number of military
deaths for the United States.
What the figures above reveal is that since WWII, military deaths for U.S.
soldiers have dropped dramatically. Of course, those figures are for only one
armed contingent in wars that always had at least two opposing contingents
and often had many military and other armed contingents. Milton Leitenberg
has been compiling figures on war-related deaths for many years. In his
2006 compilation he presents figures for all deaths in wars and conflicts from
1945–2000, broken down by civilian and military deaths.66 For example, he
estimates the overall military deaths in the Vietnam Conflict as 1,158,000
and in the Korean War as 1,672,000.67
2. Overall Military Deaths
There are a number of compilations of worldwide military deaths; Milton
Leitenberg’s comprehensive study covers the twentieth century.68 The Peace
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) has released a series of “battle death”
statistics, which has been updated from time to time, most recently in 2009,
covering the years 1946–2008.69 Micheal Clodfelter’s massive compendium
of military deaths runs from 1494–2007.70 The Correlates of War Data Sets
list “battle-related combatant fatalities” from 1816–2007, suffered by the

61

Id. at 2, 3 tbl.1.
Id. at 16 tbl.13.
63
Id. at 12 tbl.9.
64
Id. at 14 tbl.11. As of July 2012, the number of U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan totals
2,028, as reported by the U.S. Dept. of Defense. Names of the Dead, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2012, at A6.
65
Compare Civil War Casualties, CIVIL WAR TRUST (last visited Feb. 15 2013) (setting
total deaths at 620,000), with Civil War Statistics, PHIL.MUNI.CZ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013)
(setting Confederate casualties at 289,000).
66
LEITENBERG, supra note 59, at 73–79 tbl.2.
67
Id. at 76–77.
68
Id.
69
BETHANY LACINA & GABRIEL URIARTE, PRIO BATTLE DEATHS DATASET (2009), available
at http://www.prio.no/sptrans/1555324504/PRIObd3.0_documentation.pdf (combining military
and civilian deaths occurring in combat).
70
MICHEAL CLODFELTER, WARFARE AND ARMED CONFLICTS: A STATISTICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CASUALTY AND OTHER FIGURES 1494–2007 (3d ed. 2008).
62
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state for inter-state wars, or suffered by each side in the case of intra-state
wars and non-state wars.71 An earlier version of the data sets also lists these
fatalities for extra-state wars, although thirty of these wars have been
reclassified as intra-state wars and the data only runs until 1997.72 The latest
data set lists ninety-five inter-state wars, running from the Franco-Spanish
War of 1823 to the invasion of Iraq in 2003;73 335 intra-state wars running
from the First Caucasus War (Russia/Georgians) 1818–1822 to the Second
Yemeni Cleric War (Yemen/Zaidi Muslims) 2007;74 and 62 non-state wars,
running from The First Maori Tribal War of 1818–1824 to The HemdaLendu War of 1999–2005.75 The data set also includes 163 extra-state wars,
running from the Allied Bombardment of Algiers of 1816 to the Iraqi
Resistance, which began in 2003.76 As the criteria for inclusion in each list is
the same,77 the overall battle-related combatant fatalities for each list during
this period are revealing. The total fatalities for inter-state wars are
32,145,485; for extra-state wars are 2,645,294; for intra-state wars are
8,193,883; and for non-state wars (between or among non-state entities) are
255,736.78 In a number of these wars the data is entered as unknown so that
presumably the actual overall military deaths are higher than the figures
reported.
3. Civilian War-Related Deaths
a. Problems with Data Compilation on Civilian War-Related Deaths
One problem with the various tabulations on civilian war-related
casualties is that it is often impossible to discover what percentage of the

71

Correlates of War, COW Wars v. 4.0, 1816–2007, COW [hereinafter COW Wars],
available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ (follow “Available Data Sets” hyperlink; then
follow “The New COW War Data, 1816 – 2007 (v4.0)” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 15,
2013). The war data sets are now hosted at American University and The University of
Michigan-Dearborn and are compiled by Meredith Reid Sarkees & Frank Whelon Wayman.
Correlates of War, Data Set Hosting Program, COW, available at http://www.correlatesofw
ar.org/dataset_hosting.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
72
COW Wars, supra note 71.
73
SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 7, at 75, 76–77 tbl.1.1.
74
Id. at 337, 342–46 tbl.5.1.
75
Id. at 385, 487 tbl.6.1.
76
Id. at 194, 195–97 tbl.4.1.
77
The criteria for inclusion is that the war “must involve sustained combat, involving
organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities
within a twelve month period.” COW Wars, supra note 71 (follow “Inter-State Wars
Codebook.pdf” hyperlink).
78
Numbers calculated by author based on COW Wars, supra note 73.
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civilian deaths and injuries were incidental to military attacks. Many of the
statistical data sets have rejected the notion of disaggregating military
casualties from civilian casualties caused by military attacks. For example,
Lacina and Gleditsch report on worldwide battle-deaths covering the years
1946–2002.79 By the term battle-deaths they mean to include “all people,
soldiers and civilians, killed in combat.”80
Their figures are thus
compilations of all persons killed in military operations during war. They
report that the five wars that inflicted the largest numbers of battle-deaths in
the period studied were: Vietnam War (1955–1975): 2,097,705; Korean War
(1950–1953): 1,254,811; Chinese Civil War (1980–1988): 1,200,000; IranIraq War (1980–1988): 644,500; and the Afghan Civil War (1978–2002):
562,995.81 They also recognize that many other deaths come in the wake of
war “due to insecurity, displacement, deprivation, and disease.”82
The public health consequences of war are also receiving considerable
scholarly attention.83 Some estimates suggest that indirect effects of military
conflicts on mortality may be as large as the direct effect of armed conflict.84
Governments tend to keep detailed statistics on military deaths but seldom
have comprehensive civilian death statistics. Sometimes they keep statistics
on their own civilian deaths (killed by the enemy) but almost never keep
public statistics or estimates of civilians they have killed in the enemy
country. For example, in the United States, the Congressional Research
Service publishes figures on U.S. military deaths compiled by the
Department of Defense85 but publishes only sporadic, limited figures on
civilian deaths.86
As Adam Roberts concludes: “despite extensive
investigations in many war zones, and significant methodological
development, there is still a shortage of reliable data on civilian victims of

79

Lacina & Gleditsch, supra note 51, at 152ff.
Id. at 148. The authors also state: “Measuring battle deaths answers the question of how
many people were killed in military operations during a war and, therefore, it is the best
measure of the scale, scope, and nature of the military engagement that has taken place.” Id.
81
Id. at 154 tbl.1.
82
Id. at 158.
83
E.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH
(Etienne G. Krug et al. eds., 2002), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2002/92415456
15.pdf; C.J.L. Murray et al., Armed Conflict as a Public Health Problem, 324 BRIT. MED. J.
346 (2002).
84
Murray et al., supra note 83, at 347.
85
U.S. Dep’t of Def., Defense Casualty Analysis System, DMDC.OSD.MIL, https://www.dm
dc.osd.mil/dcas/casualties.xhtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
86
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) U.S. Casualty Status,
DEFENSE.GOV, http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf (last updated Feb. 15, 2013)
(including civilian casualties but only for civilian employed by Department of Defense).
80

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013 11:44 AM

324

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:307

war.”87 Beth Osborne Daponte has undertaken a careful analysis of the
statistical methodologies of five different civilian war death studies, and even
for the study she finds to have the “most credence,” she also concludes that it
presents “imperfect figures.”88
In all of the compilations there is disagreement about who should count as
a civilian, and also who among those designated as civilians should be
included in the statistics. Roberts distinguishes seven categories that have
appeared in various compilations:
All too often, there is a lack of clarity about which of the
following categories of civilian casualties are included in any
given set of figures:
1. Those killed as a direct effect of war;
2. Those injured as a direct effect of war;
3. Those dying, whether during or after a war, from
indirect effects of war such as disease, malnutrition
and lawlessness, and who would not have been
expected to die at such rates from such causes in the
absence of the war;
4. Victims of one-sided violence, such as when states
slaughter their own citizens in connection with war;
5. Victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence in
connection with a war;
6. Those uprooted in a war — that is, refugees and
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs);
7. Those who, even after war is over, die prematurely
from injuries sustained in war.89
Obviously, without agreement on which individuals to classify as civilian
casualties and which categories of civilians count toward war-related deaths,
the figures are problematic.

87
Adam Roberts, Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims Civilians?, 52 SURVIVAL
115, 118 (2010).
88
Daponte, supra note 56, at 954–57.
89
Roberts, supra note 87, at 116.
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b. Problems with Calculating the Ratio of Military to Civilian WarRelated Deaths
i. The 10 to 1; 9 to 1; and 8 to 1 Ratios
A number of high level studies give the ratio of military to civilian deaths
in war as somewhere between 10 to 1 and 8 to 1. For example, the 2001
ICRC study, quoted in Part III.A above, states that “it is estimated that ten
civilians die for every soldier or fighter killed in battle.”90 Unfortunately,
this study gives no authority for that statement. Some European Union
documents indicate that since 1990, 90% of those dying in war have been
civilians.91 Ruth Leger Sivard’s well-known compilations estimated civilian
deaths in the 1980s as 74% of total deaths and at “close to 90 percent” for the
year 1990.92 Various UN documents and reports state that civilian warrelated deaths now account for more that 90% of war deaths,93 although
some have the lower estimate of 75% civilian casualties.94 Kofi Annan,
Secretary-General of the UN (1997–2006), who cited the 75% figure added
that, with respect to the percentage of civilian war deaths, “no one really
knows.”95 Later statistics repeat these ratios, although the language often
talks of civilian “casualties” or “war victims,” and it is unclear whether the
figures include displaced people or persons who die from causes not directly
related to warfare.96 Recently, there have been some outright attacks on the
10 to 1 or 9 to 1 ratios. These ratios have been called an “urban myth” of
modern warfare.97 At the same time, more studies include both military and
civilian deaths in battle–deaths and give no disaggregated figures.98
90

Greenberg & Boorstin, supra note 54, at 19.
The European Union Institute for Security Studies, A Secure Europe in a Better World:
European Security Strategy 5 (2003) (Javier Solana), available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/
uploads/media/solanae.pdf. The report was adopted by the European Council on Dec. 12,
2003. Id. at tit. p.
92
RUTH LEGER SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1991, at 20 (1991).
93
U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of
Armed Conflict on Children: Rep. of the Expert of the Secretary-General, Ms. Graça Machel,
¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/51/150 (Aug. 26, 1996), available at http://www.unicef.org/graca/graright.
htm; U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Rep. 1998: Consumption for Human
Development 35 (1998), available at http://www.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1998.
94
Ditchley Foundation Lecture XXXV (June 26, 1998), available at http://www.ditchely.
co.uk/conference/past-programme/1990-1999/1998/lecture-xxxv.
95
Id.
96
See, e.g., PAUL COLLIER ET AL., WORLD BANK, BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL
WAR AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 17–18 (2003) (noting that new military techniques in war
have a tendency to and may be intended to displace civilian populations, resulting in higher
casualties).
97
HUMAN SECURITY CENTRE, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2005: WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21ST
91
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After a comprehensive and rigorous examination of numerous high level
studies that use the nine civilian deaths to every one military death ratio, or
sometimes a slighter lower ratio of eight civilian deaths to every one military
death, Roberts concludes that these figures are “based on shaky
foundations.”99 He does admit that it is possible that some conflict
situations, such as the Cambodian killings (1975–1979) and the Rwandan
genocide (1994), “have something close to a 9:1 ratio.”100 He does not come
to any conclusion about what ratio would be more accurate, but calls for
“more systematic recording on casualties” and “high standards of rigour and
professionalism in this work.”101
ii. The Range of Acceptable Ratios of Civilian to Military WarRelated Deaths
Many sources can be cited to support the proposition that from the time
that the distinction between soldiers and the non-military population was
established—roughly the eighteenth century—to the beginning of the
twentieth century, military deaths in wars generally far outnumbered civilian
deaths.102 For example, Matthew White reports median estimates of military
deaths in the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) as roughly 2 million with the
median estimate for civilian deaths being roughly 1 million.103 Often there
are either no figures for civilian deaths in wars before the twentieth century
or sometimes civilian deaths will include deaths from epidemics, such as
small pox, which admittedly may have been caused or aggravated by
wartime conditions.104

CENTURY 75 (2005), available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2005/text.
aspx.
98
HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT, supra note 52, at 22 fig. 1.2.
99
Roberts, supra note 87, at 115.
100
Id. at 126.
101
Id. at 128. Roberts also raises “the admittedly difficult question of whether parties
involved in armed conflicts are now, or should in future be, under an obligation to report on
numbers and possibly even names of civilian casualties, or whether the task should be left to
independent bodies.” Id.
102
See. e.g., A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 165 (2000)
(noting that the advent of air power facilitated combat deeper within enemy lines where more
civilians were harmed); Luc Reydams, A la Guerre Comme à la Guerre: Patterns of Armed
Conflict, Humanitarian Law Responses and New Challenges, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 734–
36 (2006) (describing the historical development of technology and the law of war,
culminating in the shift form “civilian war” to “total war”).
103
Matthew White, Statistics of Wars, Oppression and Atrocities of the Nineteenth Century,
NECROMETRICS, http://necrometrics.com/wars19dc.htm (last updated Mar. 2011).
104
Id.
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Many authors, including Walter Clemens and J. David Singer, support the
view of the historically rising civilian death toll related to war:
From the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 to the French
Revolution in 1789, Europe’s princes fought one another with
relatively small armies. France’s upheavals, however, gave
birth to the concept of a “nation in arms.” Starting at the same
time, the Industrial Revolution turned cities and factories into
prime targets. In most wars of the [twentieth century], civilian
deaths have outnumbered military deaths.105
Clemens and Singer have produced charts with the breakdown of military
and civilian deaths of the “principal international conflicts of the past two
centuries.”106 Their figures include “[s]oldiers killed in combat” (military
deaths), and “[c]ivilians killed, plus soldiers who died from wounds,
accidents or disease”107 (civilian deaths).108 Although some of the nineteenth
century wars had considerable civilian deaths, in virtually all of the twentieth
century wars included in the charts civilian deaths outnumber military
deaths, even though the civilian deaths include “soldiers who died from
wounds, accidents or disease.”109 These wars include the following: WWI
(1914–1918); the Russian Civil War and Russo-Polish War (1917–1921);
Chaco (Bolivia-Paraguay, 1932–1935); WWII (1939–1945); the FrancoVietnam War (1945–1954) and U.S.-Vietnam War (1963–1973); ArabIsraeli Wars (1948–1949, 1967, 1973); Korean War (1950–1953); Belgian
Congo (1960–1965); Angolan-Portuguese and Civil War (1961–1975; 1975–
1995); Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988); Iraq-Kuwait-U.N. War (1990–1991).110
In the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); and the Bangladesh-Pakistan-India
War (1971) military and civilian deaths are reported as roughly equal.111 In
the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1941) military deaths slightly outnumber
civilian deaths.112 Only in the Mozambique-Portuguese and Civil War
(1965–1975; 1975–1995); the Soviet-Afghanistan War (1979–1989) and the
105

Walter C. Clemens, Jr. & J. David Singer, A Historical Perspective: The Human Cost of
War, 282 SCI. AM. 56, 57 (June 2000); see also Sobhi Tawil, International Humanitarian Law
and Basic Education, 82 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 581 (2000) (noting that the number of civilian
victims of conflict has grown since the Cold War era).
106
Clemens & Singer, supra note 105, at 56.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 57.
109
Id. at 56.
110
Id. at 56–57.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 56.
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Serbia-Croatia-Bosnia War (1991–1995) do military deaths outnumber
civilian deaths.113
According to widely available statistics, during World War I (1914-1918)
there were over 15 million deaths.114 Of the total deaths, approximately 8.5
million were military personnel and 6.8 million were civilians.115 It is
important to note that these military figures include those combatants who
died of war-related wounds as well as general diseases, but that the majority
of military deaths still appear to have been the result of actual combat.116
Further, a large portion of the civilian deaths seem to be attributable to
famine and disease. The majority of Russia’s 2 million civilian deaths “were
caused by disease. Hunger, and privation inflated and intensified by war.”117
Other sources suggest that famine and disease had an even wider impact:
roughly 6 million dead.118 Necrometrics, a widely quoted study, reports 8.5
million military deaths for WWI and a broad range of civilian death figures
running from 5 million to 13 million, although the report admits that some of
these figures include the Russian Civil War (1917–1922) and the Armenian
Genocide (1915–1922), while others do not.119
Matthew White’s Necrometrics estimate of World War II dead comes in
at 65.6 million, which he compiled from a large number of sources; he gives
the median estimate as 50 million.120 Of these deaths he estimates roughly
19.6 million military deaths and 45.9 million civilian deaths.121 The military
deaths reported range from 22 to 25 million and the civilian deaths range
from 40 million to 52 million, 13 to 20 million of which may be attributed to
war-related disease and famine.122
The debates over the accuracy of particular statistics is often rancorous
yet there appears to be universal agreement that military deaths most likely

113

Id. at 57.
Matthew White, Source List and Detailed Death Tolls for the Primary Megadeaths of the
Twentieth Century, NECROMETRICS, http://necormetrics.com/20c5m.htm (last updated Feb.
2011).
115
Id. (calculating the civilian death total to a median range of 6.6–9 million deaths)
116
See MICHEAL CLODFELTER, WARFARE AND ARMED CONFLICTS: A STATISTICAL
REFERENCE TO CASUALTY AND OTHER FIGURES, 1500–2000, at 479–83 (2d ed. 2002)
(discussing WWI death figures by country, accounting for both combat and disease).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 480.
119
White, supra note 114.
120
Id.
121
Matthew White, National Death Tolls for the Second World War, NECROMETRICS, http://
necrometrics.com/ww2stats.htm#ww2chart (last updated Feb. 2005).
122
World War II Casualties, WIKIPEDIA, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World
_War_II_casualites#cite_note-1 (last updated Mar. 10, 2013).
114
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outnumbered civilian deaths in WWI, but that civilian deaths certainly
outnumbered military deaths in WWII.
Ruth Leger Sivard also supports the view of rising civilian deaths:
Increasingly, civilians are the major victims of war. In the first
half of [the twentieth century] they represented about 50
percent of war-related deaths. In more recent years, however,
the proportion of civilians in total deaths has been rising. Wars
are now more life-threatening for non-combatants than for
those fighting them. In the 1960s civilians counted for 63
percent of the recorded war deaths; in the 1980s for 74 percent;
and in the 1990s the rate seems to be going higher still.123
All of the above cited material includes discussion of the difficulty of
compiling such statistics. Often these materials used slightly different
terminology affecting whether certain deaths are included in certain
categories. The numbers they report do differ somewhat, and all of them
have been subjected to trenchant criticism about their statistical
methodologies.124 Nonetheless, it seems more than fair to conclude that
since the turn of the twentieth century, civilian deaths have outnumbered
military deaths in nearly all wars.
IV. THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE RULE
A. Introduction
There are two proportionality rules found in the law of armed conflict:
one found in the jus ad bellum125 and the other found in the jus in bello.126
The United Nations Charter restricts the initiation of inter-state force to two
instances: (1) self-defense after suffering an armed attack;127 (2) when
authorized to use force by the Security Council.128 In the jus ad bellum the
123

RUTH LEGER SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1996, at 7 (16th ed.,
1996), available at http://www.ruthsivard.com.wmse96selections.html.
124
E.g., Michael Spagat et al., Estimating War Deaths: An Arena of Contestation, 53 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 934 (2009). I used to think that law professors engaged in rather
acrimonious debates. Having waded through a good number of the articles attacking the
figures cited, I have now concluded that social scientists far outdo the lawyers on the scale of
rabid debate.
125
The law that regulates when it is permissible to initiate armed force.
126
The law that applies in armed conflict regardless of which party initiated the conflict.
127
U.N. Charter art. 51.
128
Id. art. 42.
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proportionality rule restricts the amount of force used to that which is
necessary to repel the initial illegal use of force.129
The second
proportionality rule, also known as the collateral damage rule, is a central
operational provision of the law of the conduct of hostilities.130 That rule
emanates from the fundamental rule of distinction between military
personnel (combatants) and military objects, on the one hand, and civilians
and civilian objects, on the other hand.131 Civilians and civilian objects may
not be attacked.132 Combatants and military objects can be attacked.133
When a combatant kills or injures an opposing combatant or destroys a
military object it is not a crime under the laws of armed combat. Although
civilians or civilian objects may end up being killed, injured, or destroyed in
warfare, such casualties are only tolerated when the civilian destruction is
incidental to an attack on a legitimate military target, and then only when the
civilian casualties are not considered likely to be “excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”134 The difficulty of
interpreting this rule will be covered below in Part IV.C. These two
proportionally rules are usually thought of as separate although it can be
argued that they are related135 and certainly both rules seek to restrain uses of
force that might otherwise be thought permissible. The section below
focuses on the collateral damage rule found in the jus in bello in light of the
changing nature of warfare and the disproportionate loss of civilian lives.

129

The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) mentioned this rule of proportionally as
constituting a customary norm. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits), ¶¶ 176, 194. See also 2 JOHN BASSET MOORE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 411–14 (1906) (quoting Daniel Webster’s correspondence
relating to the Caroline incident and the use of force in self-defense). Webster wrote that in
order to justify the destruction of the Caroline, an American ship moored at a U.S. port, as
permissible self-defense, the British would need to show that they “did nothing unreasonable
or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that
necessity, and kept clearly within it.” 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1138 (1857).
130
API, supra note 2.
131
Id. art. 48.
132
Id. art. 52, ¶ 1.
133
Id. arts. 48, 52, ¶ 2.
134
Id. art. 51, ¶ 5(b).
135
See generally Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87
AM. J. INT’L L. 391 (1993) (describing the development of the dual aspects of proportionality
as arising from the idea that war is solely aimed at weakening opposing military force).
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B. A Brief History of the Collateral Damage Rule
1. The Idea of Restraints on Warfare
The idea of restraint on the methods and means of warfare finds
expression in the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg, which provides “[t]hat
the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish during
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”136 From this principle
sprang the requirement that weapons causing “superfluous injury or
Certainly combatants are
unnecessary suffering” are prohibited.137
authorized to kill the enemy, but their methods are restricted to those that
enhance military advantage. Causing superfluous injury, by definition,
means that the injury is greater than necessary to achieving military success.
Similarly, unnecessary suffering will, by definition, go beyond what is
deemed sufficient to achieve military advantage.
Before the sixteenth century, “war was not only waged against States and
their armies, but also against their people. As a result, civilians were at the
mercy of the conquerors . . . . The notion that war is waged between soldiers
and that the population should remain outside hostilities . . . became
established by the eighteenth century.”138 During the nineteenth century,
wars were generally fought between state armies or organized armed militias,
and non-combatants were relatively unaffected by the immediate
consequences of warfare.139 Thus the earlier examples of limits on warfare,
such as the prohibition on superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering,
protect combatants rather than civilians. The prohibition on the denial of
quarter, that is, not permitting the enemy to surrender and be taken
prisoner,140 is another example of an early rule derived from humanitarian
purposes limiting the mistreatment of combatants.
In order to protect noncombatants, the law first had to develop the
definition of combatants. In other words, the law had to distinguish between

136
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight. St. Petersburg, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, available at http://
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/130?OpenDocument.
137
The modern rule is contained in API, supra note 2, art. 35, ¶ 2.
138
Id. cmt. pt. IV: § I: General Protection Against Effects of Hostilities, ¶¶ 1822, 1823
[hereinafter Commentary], available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebPrint/470-750059COM?OpenDocument.
139
Geoffrey Best, Restraints on War on Land Before 1945, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES
IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 17, 27 (Michael Howard ed., 1979).
140
The modern rule is found in API, supra note 2, art. 40 (“It is prohibited to order that there
shall be no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this
basis.”).
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those people and objects that were lawful targets and those people and
objects that were not to be targeted. The principle of distinction—which is
fundamental to humanitarian law—once developed, could then endorse the
notion that those persons or objects that could not be targeted should, as far
possible, be immune from the effects of war.141
The idea of protecting certain groups from war has ancient roots.
Historically, most major religions developed doctrines defining the occasions
when war was justified.142 Saint Augustine developed the Roman Catholic
doctrine of the “just war.”143 Islamic tradition also defined when the use of
armed force was permissible.144 Most of these traditions also exempted
certain categories of people from the effects of war. Priests, monks, and
friars were considered entitled to “full security against the ravages of
war. . . .”145 Suárez argued for the exemption from death of mercenary
soldiers taken prisoner because they could not be expected to understand the
justness of the captor’s cause.146 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the
Paquete Habana case that unarmed fishing vessels were exempt from
capture as prize of war by customary international law binding on the United
States.147 The Court also quoted the 1785 Treaty of Amity and Commerce
between the United States and Prussia, Article 23, which provided that if war
broke out
all women and children, scholars of every faculty, cultivators
of the earth, artisans, manufacturers, and fishermen unarmed
and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages, or places, and in
general all others whose occupations are for the common
subsistence and benefit of mankind, shall be allowed to
continue their respective employments, and shall not be
molested in their persons, nor shall their houses or goods be
141

GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 115 (1994); see also Prosecutor v.
Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 521–522 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kuptj000114e.pdf (noting both the prohibition on harming civilians and three notable exceptions).
142
See generally WILLIAM V. O’BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR (1981)
(discussing the early just-war doctrine of St. Augustine).
143
See generally R.A. Markus, Saint Augustine’s Views on The “Just War,” in THE CHURCH
AND WAR 1 (W.J. Sheils ed., 1983).
144
JUST WAR AND JIHAD: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR AND PEACE
IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONS 195–96 (John Kelsay & James Turner Johnson eds.,
1991).
145
JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR 127 (1981).
146
ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 69–70 (1947)
(discussing Suárez’s study on war).
147
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900).
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burnt or otherwise destroyed, nor their fields wasted by the
armed force of the enemy, into whose power, by the events of
war, they may happen to fall. . . .148
Certain objects were also declared protected from warfare. The Catholic
Church, which had used its influence to protect priests and monks, was also
successful in getting church real property and chattels protected.149 In
Shakespeare’s Henry V, Bardolph, one of the English soldiers, is hung for
stealing a pyx from a church.150 Although plunder and pillage of towns and
villages was condoned and widely practiced at the time,151 Henry showed
restraint and ordered that “there be nothing compel[ed] from the villages,
nothing taken but paid for.”152 Theodor Meron’s marvelous article:
Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, gives a detailed
catalogue of the protection from war provided to persons and property in
Medieval Europe, including church property, agricultural tools, and work
animals.153
2. The Principle of Distinction
The twentieth century saw the development of aerial bombardment,
particularly in World War I.154 Noncombatants were exposed to the effects
of war as never before.155 Gradually, the disparate categories of persons and
objects protected from war evolved into the principle of distinction. This
principle requires the parties to armed conflict to distinguish between
civilians and civilian objects, on the one hand, and combatants and military
objectives on the other hand.156 Civilians and civilian objects may not be
attacked.157 All weapons must be of a type that can “distinguish” between
categories, meaning such weapons can be aimed so as to distinguish.158 The
148

Id. at 690–91 (citing 8 Stat. 162).
Theodor Meron, Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 1,
23–24, 31–32 (1992).
150
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY THE FIFTH act 3, sc. 6 (R.J. Dorius ed., 1955).
151
Meron, supra note 147, at 32.
152
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 150, at act 3, sc. 6, ll. 112–113.
153
See generally Meron, supra note 149.
154
BEST, supra note 141, at 49–50.
155
This concern is expressed in the Commentaries to API. “In view of the development of
air warfare and the increasing resort to bombardment, the situation of the population remained
a cause for concern . . . .” Commentary, supra note 138, ¶ 1842.
156
API, supra note 2, art. 48; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 82–87 (2004).
157
API, supra note 2, art. 52, ¶ 1.
158
DINSTEIN, supra note 156, at 61.
149
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principle of distinction is obviously dependent on a careful definition of who
or what is counted as a combatant or military objective, as opposed to who or
what is counted as a civilian or civilian object. In general, combatants are
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict (except for religious
and medical personnel) together with certain other persons who take a direct
part in hostilities.159 Military objectives are defined broadly as follows:
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.160
Civilians are those people who take no direct part in hostilities and are not
members of the armed forces.161 If civilians take an active or direct part in
hostilities, they lose their civilian status and all attendant protections.162
Civilian objects are defined as any object that is not a military object.163 The
war contexts to which these definitions apply are also important.
Although the principle of distinction was developed in the context of
inter-state warfare, it is increasingly accepted that, by custom, this distinction
also applies to internal armed conflict.164 The Red Cross study of
international humanitarian law discusses twenty-four rules under the heading
“The Principle of Distinction.”165 Two of these rules, rules 3 and 4, which
define “armed forces of a party to the conflict,” only apply to international
armed conflict (IAC). Of the remaining twenty-two rules, nineteen are
firmly held to apply in both IAC and non-international armed conflict
(NIAC). The remaining three rules are listed as applicable in IAC and
arguably applicable in NIAC.166 The rules falling under the general category
159

GIII, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(1)–(2), (B).
API, supra note 2, art. 52, ¶ 2.
161
DINSTEIN, supra note 156, at 113.
162
API, supra note 2, art. 51, ¶ 3; see also Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion
of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 991, 994 (2008).
163
API, supra note 2, art. 52, ¶ 1.
164
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, I CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, ch.
1 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter Henckaerts &
Doswald-Beck].
165
Id. at pt. I.
166
Id. “Arguably applicable” is explained as follows: “[S]ome rules are indicated as being
‘arguably’ applicable because practice generally pointed in that direction but was less
extensive.” Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87
160
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of “The Principle of Distinction” include not only the generally required
distinction discussed above, but also the prohibition on indiscriminate
attacks, the collateral damage rule, the rules on precautions in attack, and
precautions against the effects of attack and also the Rules on specifically
protected persons.167
3. The Formulation of the Collateral Damage Rule
It was always understood that although civilians and civilian objects may
not be attacked, the nature of warfare being what it is, some civilians and
civilian objects might be killed, injured, or destroyed incidental to an attack
on a military target. In order to afford even greater protection to civilians
and civilian objects, a number of other rules were developed.
a. The Prohibition on Indiscriminate Attacks
Indiscriminate attacks are those attacks which are either not directed
against combatants or military objectives or are unable to distinguish
between military personnel and military objectives, and civilian personnel
and civilian objects.168 Such attacks are prohibited, as are attacks that treat as
a single military objective different military objectives located in an area
interspersed by concentrations of civilians, such as cities and towns.169 This
rule is applicable in both IAC and NIAC.170
b. Proportionality in Attack
The jus in bello proportionality rule, discussed above in the introduction
to Part IV and now codified in Additional Protocol I (API), Article 51(5)(b),
is another rule providing broader protection to civilians and civilian objects
in IAC. The weight of scholarly opinion also finds this rule applicable in
NIAC.171 The rule prohibits launching an attack on a military target “which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
Int’l Rev. Red Cross 175, 198, Annex (2005).
167
Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 164, at pt. I.
168
API, supra note 2, art. 51, ¶¶ 4–5.
169
Id.
170
Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 164, at 43.
171
Id. at Rule 14; see Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 524
(Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Jan 14, 2000) (discussing proportional attacks in
a case involving the internal conflict between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia).
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anticipated.”172 Attacks where the collateral civilian damage is expected to
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated are classified as indiscriminate attacks.173
c. Precautions in Attack
The rules regarding precautions in attack call upon the parties to do
everything possible to minimize civilian casualties.174 They must make
every effort to verify that a target is a military target rather than a civilian or
civilian object.175 Parties must assess whether an attack may be expected to
cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects that
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated. If it is discovered that the target is not a legitimate military
target or that civilian injury, death, or damage would be excessive, the attack
must be canceled or suspended.176 Where any civilian loss or damage is
expected, advance warning must be given,177 and when there is a choice of
targets, the target likely to cause the least civilian loss or damage must be
selected.178
d. Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks
The rules concerning precautions against the effects of attacks require
parties to a conflict to protect civilians and civilian objects from the dangers
of military operations. They must try to remove civilians and civilian objects
from the area where military targets are located.179 Similarly, a party’s
military objects must not be located in densely populated civilian areas.180
C. Criticisms of, and Problems with, the Collateral Damage Rule
Ever since the collateral damage rule was articulated it has been subject to
a variety of criticisms. Problems with how to weigh expected civilian
casualties or civilian property damage against anticipated concrete and direct
172

API, supra note 2, art. 51, ¶ 5(b); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 164, at 46.
API, supra note 2, art. 51, ¶ 5(b).
174
Id. art. 57, ¶ 2(a)(i); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 164, at 51–67 (listing the
rules on precautions in attack).
175
API, supra note 2, art. 57, ¶ 2(a)(i).
176
Id. art. 57, ¶¶ 2(a)(iii)–(b).
177
Id. art. 57, ¶ 2(c).
178
Id. art. 57, ¶ 3.
179
Id. art. 58(a).
180
Id. art. 58(b); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 164, at 71.
173

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013 11:44 AM

2013]

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN MODERN WARFARE

337

military advantage were perhaps predictable. Professor Gary Solis sums up
the dilemma starkly: “On the battlefield, how is a commander to balance
human life against the destruction of an enemy target? How can human lives
be compared to ‘things’? That is the terrible and impossible problem of
proportionality.”181 Questions about how to assess “excessive” civilian
damage were quickly posed, and difficulties about whether the assessment of
military advantage should relate to one attack, a series of attacks, or a whole
campaign were debated.182 The Commentaries to API (Commentaries) try to
tackle some of these issues but with commendable honesty confess that the
text “is not always as clear as one might have wished.”183 They add, perhaps
as an excuse, that “it seemed necessary to leave some margin of appreciation
to those who will have to apply the rules. Thus their effectiveness will
depend to a large extent on the good faith of the belligerents and on their
wish to conform to the requirements of humanity.”184 Good faith, of course,
is required in the interpretation and performance of all treaties185 but if the
terms of the treaty leave open a variety of possible interpretations, good faith
will not ensure uniform application. Again with respect to putting these
provisions into practice, the Commentaries call for “complete good faith on
the part of the belligerents, as well as the desire to conform with the general
principle of respect for the civilian population.”186
Some issues are resolved by the Commentaries. To the suggestion that
API, Article 51(5)(b) might authorize any type of attack provided civilian
losses were not excessive in relation to military advantage, the
Commentaries boldly state that “[t]his theory is manifestly incorrect.”187
They further point out that “the attack must be directed against a military
objective with means which are not disproportionate in relation to the
objective.”188 In other situations, the Commentaries acknowledge more
ambiguity. On the issues of weighing civilian losses against military
advantage, there are admitted problems: “Of course, the disproportion
between losses and damages caused and the military advantages anticipated
raises a delicate problem; in some situations there will be no room for doubt,
while in other situations there may be reason for hesitation. In such
181

SOLIS, supra note 4, at 273.
See Commentary, supra note 138, ¶ 1976 (noting much discussion about the nature of
Article 5 attacks when analyzed in relations to “concrete military advantage”).
183
Id. ¶ 1835.
184
Id.
185
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 26, 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
186
Commentary, supra note 138, ¶ 1978.
187
Id. ¶ 1979.
188
Id.
182
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situations the interests of the civilian population should prevail. . . .”189 This
comment does not exactly tell us what qualifies as “excessive” civilian
losses, but it does offer guidance in some situations. William Fenrick’s
excellent article reviewing the development of API’s articles on
proportionality concludes that attacks are clearly excessive when there is
clear evidence that such attacks were actually directed against civilians, “but
how much higher the standard is to be drawn is unclear.”190 The late Leslie
Green also concludes that “there is no definition as to what is
‘excessive.’ ”191
The question of whether military advantage should be weighed against
civilian damage for each individual attack, or on a cumulative basis of many
attacks, or perhaps a whole campaign, has spawned different answers.
Professor Farer argues that using the cumulative approach could have dire
consequences for civilians.192 Professor Gardam thinks that the words
concrete and direct, in conjunction with military advantage, indicate “that
the Protocol requires that proportionality be assessed in relation to each
individual attack, rather than on a cumulative basis.”193 Professor Dinstein
generally concludes that proportionality “has to be calculated in relation to a
given attack, rather than on an ongoing cumulative footing.”194 However, he
cautions that “[i]f an extensive air campaign is undertaken, it would be
mistaken to focus on the outcome of an isolated sortie.”195 The Statute of the
International Criminal Court includes in its list of war crimes the intentional
launch of an attack done with the knowledge that the likely collateral civilian
damage will be “clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated.”196 The assessment in light of overall
military advantage appears to require a broader scope than simply one
individual attack. Leslie Green seems to propose that either a limited
campaign or the overall war effort can be an acceptable mode of assessment:
“[T]he definition whether an objective is legitimate or not, depends upon the
189

Id.
William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare,
98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 102 (1982).
191
LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 391 (3d ed. 2008).
Green continues: “The decision must be made in accordance with reasonable assessments and
expectations. . . .” Id.
192
Tom J. Farer, The Laws of War 25 Years After Nuremberg, 39 INT’L CONCILIATION 1,
16–17 (May 1971).
193
Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L.
391, 407 (1993).
194
DINSTEIN, supra note 156, at 123.
195
Id.
196
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(iv), adopted July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added).
190
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contribution an attack upon that object will make to ultimate victory [i.e. the
entire war effort] or the success of the operation of which the attack is part
[i.e. the particular campaign within the wider war].”197
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
has tackled the issue of whether the single or cumulative attack approach to
proportionality is appropriate. In Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., the Tribunal
engaged in a general discussion of the protection of civilians in armed
conflict, recognizing that “deliberate attacks on civilians or civilian objects
It
are absolutely prohibited by international humanitarian law.”198
nonetheless mentioned three exceptions to this general proscription including
unavoidable collateral damage to civilians.199 The Tribunal discussed the
principle of proportionality and the Martens Clause200 which requires the
application of “principles of humanity” and the “dictates of public
conscience” in cases not covered by treaties or, as the Tribunal states, “when
interpreting and applying loose international rules.”201 Weaving together the
proportionality rule and the Martens Clause, the Tribunal considered whether
a group of individual attacks that might each meet the proportionality
requirements, might nevertheless be found violative of the laws of armed
conflict when looked at cumulatively:
As an example of the way in which the Martens Clause may be
utilised, regard might be had to considerations such as the
cumulative effect of attacks on military objectives causing
incidental damage to civilians. In other words, it may happen
that single attacks on military objectives causing incidental
damage to civilians, although they may raise doubts as to their
lawfulness, nevertheless do not appear on their face to fall foul
per se of the loose prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 [of API]
(or of the corresponding customary rules). However, in case of
repeated attacks, all or most of them falling within the grey
area between indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might
197

GREEN, supra note 191.
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 521 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
For the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000).
199
Id. ¶ 522.
200
The Martens Clause was first included in the 1899 Preamble to Hague Convention II
with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (available at: http://icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
FULL/150?OpenDocument) and now appears in all four Geneva Conventions and in API and
APII with slightly varying language. GI, supra note 11, art. 63; GII, supra note 11, art. 62;
GIII, supra note 11, art. 142; GIV, supra note 11, art. 158; API, supra note 2, art. 1, ¶ 2; APII,
supra note 6, pmbl.
201
Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶¶ 524, 525.
198
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be warranted to conclude that the cumulative effect of such acts
entails that they may not be in keeping with international law.
Indeed, this pattern of military conduct may turn out to
jeopardise excessively the lives and assets of civilians, contrary
to the demands of humanity.202
The Tribunal’s discussion in Kupreškić might well lead any military
commander with authority over a broad geographic area of conflict to believe
that having subordinate commanders of individual attacks engage in
proportionality assessments for each attack might relieve those subordinate
commanders of criminal responsibility (unless they knew or should have
known of the likely effects of the overall campaign) but might not protect the
commander of the overall campaign.
Yet another proportionality issue, regarding the effect of high value
targets on assessing overall military advantage, has proved troublesome.
Since the rule calls for balancing civilian damage against military advantage,
naturally enough people have asked what happens to this balancing when it
is agreed that eliminating a particular military object or combatant has an
extremely high value and would result in considerable military advantage
even though many civilians may have to be killed in the process. In other
words, are more civilian deaths and injury or greater damage to civilian
property permitted because a high value target is perceived to increase the
military advantage? Dinstein accepts that the higher the military value the
target holds (necessarily a subjective judgment), the higher the acceptable
number of civilian losses:
Even extensive civilian casualties may be acceptable, if they
are not excessive in light of the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated. The bombing of an important army or
naval installation (like a naval shipyard) where there are
hundreds or even thousands of civilian employees need not be
abandoned merely because of the risk to those civilians.203
Solis, however, gives several hypothetical and real examples illustrating
the problem of the changing ratio of civilian deaths when compared with
military advantage. He asks the following questions:

202
203

Id. ¶ 526.
DINSTEIN, supra note 156, at 121.
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[H]ow many noncombatant lives would be acceptable forfeit
for the targeting and killing of Saddam Hussein and his two
sons, the three of whom were legitimate military targets?
Would the anticipated direct military advantage gained by their
deaths, while the international armed conflict was still in
progress, mitigate the deaths of ten civilians? Twenty? A
hundred?204
In April 2003, U.S. forces dropped four satellite-guided bombs on a Baghdad
neighborhood, missing the targeted restaurant and killing as many as
fourteen civilians based on apparently incorrect information that Saddam and
his sons were at the location.205 Was the attack disproportional? The May 1,
2011 killing of the Al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, was apparently
accomplished by storming the compound where he lived in Abbotabad,
Pakistan, with only four other deaths of compound residents who may or
may not have been entitled to civilian status.206 Suppose instead that reliable
information had finally tracked bin Laden to the compound and U.S. forces
had decided to bomb the compound killing bin Laden but also killing fifty
civilians, injuring sixty more and razing twenty houses in the adjacent area.
Would such an attack be disproportional? Solis, apparently admitting the
insolubility of the ratio calculation, commented: “Such calculations are one
of the burdens of high military command.”207
In some recent wars, the outrage produced by any civilian deaths has been
so great that military commanders have used rules of engagement that are
204

SOLIS, supra note 4, at 278.
David Blair, Smart Bombs Aimed at Saddam Killed Families, Telegraph (Apr. 21, 2003),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleast/Iraq/1428061/Smart-bombs-aimed-atSaddam-killed-familes.html; Jack Gruber, U.S. Bombs Site after Intelligence Says Saddam
Was Meeting There, USA TODAY (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/Iraq/
2003-04-07-war-main_x.htm.
206
Those dead were reported as one of bin Laden’s sons, two of his brothers, and one of his
wives. Scott Wilson et al., Osama bin Laden Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at Sea, WASH. POST
(May 2, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/osama-bin-laden-killed-in-us-raid-bu
ried-at-sea/2011/05/02/AFx0yAZf_story.html. The issue of whether bin Laden was given the
opportunity to surrender has been widely discussed. Even though Obama administration
members have said that they were prepared “to take bin Laden into custody, if it were possible
to do so”; Steve Coll states that the claim that capturing bin Laden was part of the Navy Seals’
ROEs “is not easy to reconcile with the on-site decision to shoot bullets into his writhing
body.” Steve Coll, Dead or Alive, N.Y. REV. OF BKS, Oct. 25, 2012, available at http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/25/bin-laden-dead-or-alive/?pageniation=false; Raffi
Khatchadourian, Bin Laden: The Rules of Engagement,NEW YORKER (May 4, 2011), http://
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/05/bin-laden-the-rules-of-engagement.
html.
207
SOLIS, supra note 4, at 280.
205
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considerably stricter than required by proportionality.208 Before the internet,
smart phones, and the ever growing battery of social media communication
systems, the only people that would likely know what happened in a
particular attack or campaign in remote areas were those directly involved.
Even in populated areas, the number of people with knowledge of the event
would likely be very limited. That has now changed fundamentally. First, it
seems as if almost no act, however small and possibly insignificant, takes
place outside the range of some recording system. As soon as there is an
explosion, riot, or weapon discharge, photographs and sound recordings
rapidly find their way onto all sorts of media outlets, and soon the whole
world can view the event.209 This phenomenon allows civil society to
express its views as never before; the death of one civilian can mobilize
thousands.210 During the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, civilian deaths were
antagonizing the Iraqi population to a great extent. United States policy at
the time was to have the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, personally
approve any attack where it was estimated that thirty or more civilians might
be killed.211
More recently, civilian deaths in Afghanistan have been viewed as so
antithetical to the overall military mission that the Rules of Engagement
(ROE) have severely limited attacks where any civilian deaths are
expected.212 Colonel Clay Hall, who has served in both Iraq and
208

See infra note 212.
For example, the riots following the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit and vegetable
seller were posted on Facebook and led to further riots in Tunisia and elsewhere. Witnesses
Report Rioting in Tunisian Town, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2
010/12/19/ozatp-tunisia-riot-idAFJOEB106U20101219; Tunisia: 11 Die in New Clashes After
Weeks of Unrest, GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/09/Tu
nisia-clashes-weeks-unrest.
210
In December 2010, a Tunisian man burned himself to death in protest after police
confiscated the fruit and vegetables he was selling; that act is widely seen as giving rise to the
revolt in Tunisia and other Arab nations. Gary Blight et al., Arab Spring: An Interactive
Timeline of Middle East Protests, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline.
211
Michael R. Gordon & Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II 89 (2006).
212
The ROE for troops in Afghanistan are classified but were widely reported as put in place
by General Stanley McChrystal in 2009 and were aimed at limiting civilian casualties.
Petraeus to Modify Afghanistan Rules of Engagement, Source Says, FOXNEWS.COM (June 25,
2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/06/25/petreus-modify-afghanistan-rules-engage
ment-source-says/. Some military factions complained about the ROEs, which they claimed
“have effectively forced the troops to fight with one hand tied behind their backs.” Id. These
ROEs were apparently revised in February 2010 to further limit tactical warfare. Sarah
Holewinski & James Morin, Afghanistan War: New Rules of Engagement Don’t Pit Civilians
vs. Soldiers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Comment
ary/Opinion/2010/0310/Afghanistan-war-New-rules-of-engagement-don-t-pit-civilians-vs.-sol
diers.
209
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Afghanistan, has reportedly stated that once the goal is articulated as
stabilizing the country “it’s pretty hard to do that when you’re dropping
bombs on innocent people.”213
A recent United Nations report states that civilian deaths and injuries in
Afghanistan rose by 15% from 2009 to 2010.214 The figures are revealing:
“There were 2,777 conflict-related civilian deaths in 2010 . . . .”215 Of
course, pro-government forces216 are only responsible for a limited
proportion of such deaths and injuries, and it is estimated that the proportion
of civilians killed by the pro-government forces has in fact declined from
26% in 2009 to 16% in 2010.217 The U.N. Report, which was issued in
March 2011, concludes that the number of civilian deaths has risen from
1,523 in 2007 to 2,777 in 2010.218 In 2010, anti-government elements219
were estimated to be responsible for 2,080 of the civilian deaths, progovernment forces were responsible for 440 deaths, and 257 deaths were
unattributable to any faction.220
There has been much written about the suggestion that collateral damage
is reduced through the use of precision weapons, particularly unmanned
213

Anna Mulrine, How Afghanistan Civilian Deaths Have Changed the Way the US Military
Fights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 27, 2011), http://csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/
0727/How-Afghanistan-civilian-deaths-have-changed-the-way-the-US-military-fights.
214
U.N. Assistance Mission in Afg., Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians
in Armed Conflict 2010, 27–28 (Mar. 2011), http://unana.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/
human%20rights/March%20PoC%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf.
215
Citing Rising Death Toll, UN Urges Better Protection of Afghan Civilians, UN NEWS
CENTRE (Mar. 9, 2011), http//www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37715&Cr=Afghan
&Cr1#.UF8_eaTyZqc; U.N. Assistance Mission in Afg., supra note 214, at 57.
216
The U.N. Report defines as Pro-Government Forces (PGF) as follows:
Afghan Government Forces. All forces that act in all military or paramilitary
counter-insurgency operations and are directly or indirectly under the control
of the Government of Afghanistan. These forces include, but are not limited
to, the ANA [Afghan National Army], ANP [Afghan National Police], the
Afghan Border Police (ABP) and the NDS [National Directorate of Security,
Afghanistan’s state intelligence service].
UN NEWS CENTRE, supra note 215, glossary.
217
Id. at i.
218
Id. at 57.
219
The U.N. Report defines Anti-Government Elements (AGE) as follows:
[A]ll individuals and armed groups currently involved in armed conflict
against the Government of Afghanistan and/or international military forces.
They include those who identify as “Taliban” as well as individuals and
groups motivated by a range of objectives and assuming a variety of labels
including the Haqqani network, Hezb-e-Islami and al-Qaida affiliates such as
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkari Tayyiba
and Jaysh Muhammad.
Id. glossary.
220
Id. at 57.
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drones.221 The legality of drone attacks, sometimes operated by non-military
personnel, in countries that may not have given permission for such attacks,
and that target specific people, is beyond the scope of this article.222
However, it is important to note that the accuracy of reports suggesting
minimal civilian damage resulting from such attacks has been challenged,223
and in any event, the overall statistics for civilian deaths and injury generally
remain disproportionate to military deaths and injury, even in wars that
employ such weapons.224
D. Does the Collateral Damage Rule Require a Direct Causal Link from
Military Attack to Civilian Death or Damage to Violate the Rule?
Causation is a slippery concept that has tested philosophers and scientist
for centuries. This Article is not intended to enter into debate about the
complex meaning of causation in various contexts. In general, if one action
brings about a result or effect that would not otherwise have occurred, then
the result or effect is said to have been caused by the earlier action. It is
recognized that some effects or results are directly caused by the earlier
event and that some effects or results come about by a combination of factors
so that the earlier event may be said to be only an indirect cause of the later
results. This general understanding of causation is quite sufficient for
discussing causation in relation to the collateral damage rule largely because
civilian loss and damage only needs to be incidental to the attack on the
military target to fall within the ambit of the rule.225
Most of the war casualty figures, cited in Part III.C above, include
military deaths and civilian deaths occurring as a direct result of combat.226
Some of the figures include other forms of military deaths, such as from

221

E.g., Jane Mayer, The Predator War, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 36, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer (discussing the risk
of using unmanned drones to target terrorists).
222
See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case
Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009 (Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 09-43, 2010), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144; Charlie Savage, U.N. Official
to Ask U.S. to End C.I.A. Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A8; Alston Says Drone
Attacks on Pakistan-Afghanistan Border May Violate International Law, NYU LAW (Oct. 30,
2009), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ALSTON_UN_GENERALASSEMBLY.
223
See, e.g., Scott Shane, C.I.A. Is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 2012, at A1 (noting that the number of civilian casualties in drone strikes reported by
official and unofficial sources are “so at odds that they seem to describe different events”).
224
See Part III.C.
225
API, supra note 2, art. 51, ¶ 5(b).
226
See, e.g., Lacina & Gleditsch, supra note 51, at 148.
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disease,227 and civilian deaths, such as from general violence, social
disruption, or famine associated with war.228 An argument may be made that
the military cannot be held responsible for all the civilian deaths, injury, and
damage that may result from the general consequences of war and that the
laws of war do not ascribe culpability to the military for such overall civilian
losses. The statisticians that compile battle-deaths for civilians, clearly
intend to imply that the civilian deaths and damage were caused directly by
combat.229 Figures relating to deaths caused by disease, famine, and general
disruption are also clearly compiled by those who see these consequences as
emanating from military engagements.230
When considering inter-state wars, which involve only armed forces of
opposing states, it is easy to pin-point the civilian death and destruction
resulting from military attacks. When dealing with intra-state wars,
particularly where there are several armed factions fighting, it may be
difficult to determine which armed faction caused the particular civilian
destruction; nevertheless the fighting has led to the civilian devastation.231
Thus it may be concluded that civilian death and destruction come about as a
result of war. Some deaths occur immediately as a result of battle. Some
occur later, such as death from battle injuries and infection. Some take even
longer to develop, such as deaths from widespread famine caused by general
societal disruption in the wake of war. However, in a general sense, all of
these statistics indicate that the civilian deaths, injuries, and property damage
have been caused by war.
One interesting aspect of the collateral damage rule is that it does not
prohibit direct targeting of civilians.232 That is prohibited elsewhere in
API.233 What the rule prohibits in connection with attacks on military targets
is “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof,” when such losses are expected to “be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage

227

Clemens & Singer, supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
229
See, e.g., Lacina & Gleditsch, supra note 51, at 148 (explaining that to limit studies to
combatant deaths could seriously underplay the effects of war).
230
E.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 83, at 218; Murray et al., supra note 83.
231
Studies demonstrate that overall societal violence rises during war, leading to more
civilian death, injury, and property damage as an indirect result of the war but persisting after
the end of conflict. JORIS VOORHOEVE, FROM WAR TO THE RULE OF LAW: PEACE BUILDING
AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICTS 105 (2007). These deaths are not generally included in war-death
statistics.
232
API, supra note 2.
233
“The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of
attack.” Id. art. 51, ¶ 2.
228
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anticipated.”234 The word incidental is significant but is not addressed, as
such, by the Commentaries. What do we understand from the word
incidental when applied to the “loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof” that might be expected
to result from a legitimate attack on a military target?
Dictionaries, prosaic though they are, may prove useful in aiding our
understanding of the word incidental. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines incidental as follows:
1.a. Occurring or liable to occur in fortuitous or subordinate
conjunction with something else of which it forms no essential
part; casual.235
The American Heritage Dictionary of The English Language has a similar
definition:
1. Occurring or likely to occur as an unpredictable or minor
consequence. . . .
2. Of a minor, casual, or subordinate nature. . . .236
Collins English Dictionary has three relevant definitions of incidental:
1.
2.
3.

happening in connection with or resulting from something
more important; casual or fortuitous
. . . found in connection (with); related (to)
. . . caused (by).237

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary entry has two definitions:
1. a: being likely to ensue as a chance or minor
consequence . . . .
2. occurring merely by chance or without intention or
calculation.238

234

Id. art. 51, ¶ 5(b).
VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 794 (2d ed. 1989), available at http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/93467?redirectFrom=incidental#@id.
236
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2011),
available at http://www.ahdictionary.com/.
237
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2003), available at http://www.collinsdictionary.
com/dictionary/English/incidental?showCookiePolicy=true.
238
MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003), available at http://www.
235
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This dictionary also lists synonyms for “incidental”:
Synonym: casual, chance, fluky (also flukey), fortuitous,
inadvertent, unintentional, unplanned, unpremeditated,
unwitting.239
It is worth noting that, with the exception of the third definition in Collins
English Dictionary, none of the above definitions indicates direct causation
from one event to the next. From this we may confidently conclude that the
overwhelming consensus on the definition of incidental is that although an
incidental event will follow an earlier event (military attack) or be associated
with it, there is no requirement that the civilian death or damage incidental to
the military attack be caused directly by the military attack to be prohibited.
Rather, any civilian death, injury or damage that “occur[s] in fortuitous or
subordinate conjunction with . . . [a military attack] of which it forms no
essential part. . . .”;240 occurs “as an unpredictable or minor
consequences . . . .”241 of a military attack; or happens “in connection
with”242 a military attack, is incidental to the military attack and thus falls
within the scope of the collateral damage rule.243 All of the civilian loss
statistics quoted in Part III.C.3 certainly fall within the definition of
occurrences incidental to military attacks. In any war, therefore, where the
ratio of civilian to military deaths is at least equal, such consequences are
surely excessive given the clear understanding expressed in the
Commentaries that “[i]ncidental losses and damages should never be
extensive”244 no matter what the military advantage might be.
E. Conclusion on the Protection Afforded to Civilians by the Collateral
Damage Rule
Despite the many interpretational and operational problems with the
collateral damage rule, there is little doubt that it is meant to provide
protection from military attacks on civilians beyond what is required by the
basic rule of discrimination and the prohibition on targeting civilians or
civilian objects, or that it does so in a context where military and civilian

merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incidental.
239
Id.
240
VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 235.
241
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 236.
242
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 237.
243
See sources cited supra notes 172–75.
244
Commentary, supra note 138, ¶ 1980, and text at infra notes 254–56.
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targets are intermeshed. Nonetheless, in an era when civilian war-related
deaths are recorded as disproportionate to military deaths, the continuing
validity of the rule demands further examination.245 Even in an era when
high precision weapons may, in some instances, reduce civilian collateral
damage,246 the overall civilian toll from warfare belies the notion that civilian
war-related deaths and injuries are simply incidental (or collateral) to
legitimate military destruction and death.
V. THE REGULATORY EFFECT OF THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE RULE IN
LIGHT OF ITS OVERALL FAILED PURPOSE
A. Introduction
This Article has examined the collateral damage rule in light of the
changing nature of warfare and the shifting ratios of military to civilian warrelated deaths. If the overall purpose of the collateral damage rule is to
protect civilians from attack in circumstances where some civilian damage
may be expected, the rule does not seem to be working very well. This part
of the Article will examine the purpose of the collateral damage rule viewed
both narrowly and broadly. It will then examine the general question: What
happens to legal rules that cannot effectuate their overall purposes? Finally,
this section includes suggestions about what should happen to the collateral
damage rule.
B. The Purposes of the Collateral Damage Rule Viewed Narrowly and
Broadly
The title to API, Article 51 is “Protection of the Civilian Population.”247
Civilians are meant to “enjoy general protection against dangers arising from
military operations.”248 The rules that follow in the various succeeding
paragraphs are designed “[t]o give effect to this protection.”249 Civilians
may not be the object of an attack250 and indiscriminate attacks are
prohibited.251 Various types of indiscriminate attacks are described,
including those that violate the collateral damage rule.252 An attack which
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252

See supra Parts III.C.2, III.C.3.b.
See, e.g., Shane, supra note 223.
API, supra note 2, art. 51, tit.
Id. art. 51, ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. art. 51, ¶ 2.
Id. art. 51, ¶ 4.
Id. art. 51, ¶ 5(b).
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“may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated” is prohibited as indiscriminate.253
The official Commentaries to Article 51, paragraph 5(b) have already
been mentioned254 but it is worth adding that the Commentaries explored the
possibility that very high civilian death and damage might “be justified if the
military advantage at stake is of great importance.”255 The response to this
suggestion was quite clear that such a view is not correct:
This idea is contrary to the fundamental rules of the Protocol;
in particular it conflicts with Article 48 ‘(Basic Rule)’
[principle of distinction] and with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
present Article 51 [general protection for civilians from
dangers of military operations and prohibition on attacking
civilians and on acts of violence to spread terror among
civilians]. The Protocol does not provide any justification for
attacks which cause extensive civilian losses and damages.
Incidental losses and damages should never be extensive.256
Dinstein accuses some commentators of “confus[ing] the term ‘excessive’
with ‘extensive’ ”257 and cites Claude Pilloud’s and Jean Pictet’s
Commentary on the Additional Protocols.258 Dinstein calls this a textual
misreading.259 He concludes that: “Even extensive civilian casualties may be
acceptable, if they are not excessive in light of the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.”260 While Dinstein is correct that the text of
API, Article 51, paragraph 5(b) uses the term excessive, Pilloud and Pictet
were quite well aware of the language of the text but were making the point
quoted above, namely, that even if the military advantage is great, extensive
civilian casualties are never justified and always considered excessive.261
Certainly, some civilian death and damage is permissible under the rule,
but it was quite clear that the application of the collateral damage rule was
never expected to result in ratios where civilian deaths outnumber military
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261

Id.
See supra note 138.
Commentary, supra note 138, ¶ 1980.
Id. (emphasis added).
DINSTEIN, supra note 156, at 120.
Commentary, supra note 138, at 626.
DINSTEIN, supra note 156, at 121.
Id.
See Commentary, supra note 138, ¶ 1980.
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deaths, or even where civilian and military deaths are equal. Civilian
damage that could predictably outweigh military damage, sometimes by
several multiples, was intended to be beyond the scope of permissible
military activity.
Area bombardment wherein distinct military objects are located among
concentrations of civilians and civilian objects is prohibited by API, Article
51, paragraph 5(a).262 The commentary on this subparagraph makes specific
reference to “carpet bombing or saturation bombing.”263 It also noted that
there were many examples of such bombings in WWII and that they were
characterized by “destroy[ing] all life in a specific area and raz[ing] to the
ground all buildings situated there.”264 The collateral damage rule, operating
in concert with other protections of civilians found in this section of API,
made such activity illegal.
The collateral damage rule, even if interpreted narrowly as only
addressing each particular attack,265 was never meant to permit extensive
civilian damage even if the military advantage was great. Particular attacks
where the civilian damage is not extensive and the military advantage is
concrete and direct might meet the rule’s requirements, but if either the
overall campaign or the war itself results in extensive civilian death, injury
and damage, the collateral damage rule will have been violated. The narrow
object of the rule is to protect civilians exposed to injury as part of a specific
attack on a military target. The broad object of the rule is to ensure that wars
do not result in extensive civilian deaths and damage. Where wars result in
extensive civilian losses, which they almost always do, the collateral damage
rule will have been violated many times.
C. The Fate of Legal Rules That Cannot Fulfill Their Overall Purposes
What happens to legal rules that are frequently violated and perceived as
unable to fulfill their purposes? All law faces the problem of inefficacy, and
we might look for solutions in a wide range of topics and eras. A few
random examples will set the stage for thinking about approaches to this
dilemma. Sometimes statutes in the area of criminal law remain on the
books but are simply never enforced. Fornication, even between consenting
adults, remains an offense in many developed states, but one looks in vain
for its prosecution, except in theocratic states.266 In these cases we speak of
262
263
264
265
266

API, supra note 2, art. 51, ¶ 5(a).
Commentary, supra note 138, ¶ 1968.
Id.
But see supra notes 192–202 (noting the tendency to reject this approach).
E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (West 1953). Until recently, fornication was also a
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the law falling into desuetude. Eventually, it gets removed from the statute
books.
Sometimes a rule is seen as both ineffective and encouraging other
undesired consequences. In the United States, abortion was prohibited
before 1973; performing or submitting to an abortion was a criminal offense
except in certain instances to save the mother’s life.267 When the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade268 that abortions could not be prohibited
prior to roughly the last trimester of pregnancy, it did so for a number of
reasons. Principally, the Court ruled that the mother’s constitutionally
protected right to privacy trumped any right to future life that the non-viable
fetus might be thought to possess.269 Other considerations were also
persuasive. Evidence was presented to the Court showing “high mortality
rates at illegal ‘abortion mills.’ ”270 Clearly, the prohibition of abortion was
not working and brought in its wake the unintended consequences of killing
a large number of women every year. As a result, abortion prior to the final
trimester of pregnancy is now usually permitted, but must be carried out in
regulated medical establishments.271
Moving away from the criminal context, the area of treaty law also
provides some insight. Until recently, virtually every U.S. extradition treaty
contained a political offense exception basically stating that a fugitive from
justice would not be extradited for political offenses.272 The classic
definition of the political offense is that a person has engaged in a crime in
the course of trying to overthrow an existing government and put another
government in its place.273 Such crimes could include killing police officers,
or blowing up army barracks, or a whole variety of other violent crimes
against the state. After it was pointed out that the United States almost never
criminal offense in Virginia, but the statute was struck down as violation of the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution in Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005). For examples
of theocratic states criminalizing fornication, see Punishment for Non-Marital Sex in Islam:
Examples of Convictions Under Sharia Law, which is available at http://www.religiousintoler
ance.org/isl_adu1.htm (last updated Sept. 26, 2002).
267
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191–1194, 1196 (West 1971), declared unconstitutional by
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
268
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
269
Id. at 153–54, 163–64.
270
Id. at 150.
271
Id. at 163–65.
272
E.g., Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., art.
V(1)(c), June 9, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 227.
273
See Valerie Epps, Abolishing the Political Offense Exception, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 203, 204–05 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988) (noting that the
exception developed as a response to revolutionary action and was meant to excuse crimes
deemed acceptable only because of the political beliefs of the offender).
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entered into extradition treaties with another state unless the two shared
roughly the same political values, it was seen as foolish to refuse to extradite
someone who attempted to overthrow a government that basically has the
same political system and values as the United States.274 As a result, over the
last thirty years, the United States has been systematically dropping the
political offense exception clause from most of its extradition treaties.
In the area of weapons conventions, there are two cardinal rules. First,
the weapon must be able to distinguish between military personnel and
objects, on the one hand, and civilian personnel and objects, on the other
hand.275 Second, the weapon must never cause unnecessary suffering to
combatants or anyone else.276 Where a weapon is shown to violate one, or
both, of these cardinal rules, the international community will draft a treaty
and the weapon will be banned.277
Applying any of the solutions listed above to the collateral damage rule,
however, would not solve the problem. If the rule were left as it is in the
Protocol and never expected to curb military action or to be enforced (as with
prohibitions on fornication), we would essential be condoning the
widespread death of civilians in the wake of war. If the rule were struck
down (as with the prohibition on abortion), we would be left with the
principle of distinction absent the greater protection intended by the
collateral damage rule. Such a solution would likely result in greater levels
of civilian losses. Similarly, trying to dismantle part of the overall legal
scheme deemed to have adverse consequences, like removing the political
offense exception to extradition treaties, would not work because the
collateral damage rule is not causing the adverse consequences—namely the
large numbers of civilian casualties. Although banning the entity or action
that causes the adverse consequences—banning armies or military attacks in
the same way that particular weapons are banned—would, if carried out, be
effective in reducing civilian causalities, one only has to articulate such a
solution to know that it would be generally unacceptable.
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Id. at 206.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
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Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. Other such
conventions can be found at the ICRC Document Database located at http://icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
TOPICS?OpenView#CustomaryLaw.
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VI. CONCLUSION: A FEW MODEST SUGGESTIONS TO ASSIST THE
FULFILLMENT OF THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE RULE
Because of the changing nature of warfare, this Article has argued that
modern warfare almost always results in extensive civilian death and damage
in violation of the collateral damage rule. The current nature of warfare,
therefore, makes the violation of the collateral damage rule inevitable in all
but isolated examples of war. Armed forces are sent to war to destroy the
enemy’s armed forces (in international armed conflict) or destroy
government forces or rebel forces (in internal armed conflict). They are not
sent to kill civilians or damage civilian property except when civilian death
or injury or civilian property damage is incidental to a legitimate attack on a
military target. What happens, however, in practically all cases is that the
military activity results in at least as many civilians dying and suffering
injury as military personnel. Often the civilian casualties outweigh military
casualties.
If we simply removed the collateral damage rule while leaving, as part of
the laws of war, the prohibition on directly targeting civilians, two possible
results might ensue. Any amount of civilian collateral damage would be
permissible so long as it was somehow attached to an initial attack on a
legitimate target. Alternatively, no amount, or possibly only very limited
amounts, of civilian damage would be tolerated. Obviously, to permit
widespread and extensive civilian damage that was somehow tangentially
connected to a legitimate attack on military personnel or military objects
would fly in the face of the long struggle to protect civilians from the effects
of warfare. Indeed, it would in large measure give the green light to carpet
bombing whole cities and towns with weapons of mass destruction. That
way lies chaos. Similarly, ruling that no amount of civilian damage will ever
be tolerated and that all attacks resulting in any civilian losses will constitute
violations of the laws of war seems unrealistic and draconian as long as we
allow wars and send out armies with instructions to destroy enemy
combatants and other military targets.
First, we need to acknowledge that we have a problem. Despite the
principle of distinction and the collateral damage rule, civilians are just as
likely, or often more likely, to die in war as military personnel. Next, we
need to make clear how much civilian damage is, or is not, permissible in
attacks, campaigns, and overall wars. Due to nearly instantaneous media
reporting of civilian death and damage, lawmakers may be galvanized to
require even further restrictions on civilian losses. We know from the results
of the recent ROEs in Afghanistan that commanders can significantly reduce
civilian deaths. Fashioning language to accomplish further and clearer
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protections for civilians will not be easy, and gaining international agreement
will take time.
Another, concurrent step we need is a clear rule requiring states and other
organized fighting groups to keep “body counts” of civilian dead and injured
together with inventories of civilian damage. These figures should be kept
both for injuries to the state’s (or fighting group’s) own civilian personnel
and objects and for the adversary’s civilian population and civilian
structures. The figures should be made public. The ICRC, or another
impartial body with sufficient expertise, should also be charged with
compiling similar civilian death and damage counts and publically reporting
the figures.
It is widely agreed that three of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
require states to record details of military personnel who are killed, wounded,
captured, or go missing during armed conflict.278 The Fourth Geneva
Convention, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
simply requires that: “As far as military considerations allow, each Party to
the conflict shall facilitate the steps taken to search for the [civilians] killed
and wounded, to assist the shipwrecked and other persons exposed to grave
danger, and to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment.”279 Additional
Protocol I, on the other hand, actually has more detailed provisions for
seeking and recovering the bodies of civilians lost or killed in conflict.280
This Protocol currently has 172 parties, not including the United States.281
Additional Protocol II has a general provision requiring parties to search for
and collect the dead and wounded “[w]henever circumstances permit.”282
This Protocol currently has 166 parties, again not including the United
States.283 Obviously, the Geneva Conventions and Protocols have gaps in
the requirements for recording all civilian deaths and injuries in armed
conflict.
In June 2011, Susan Breau and Rachel Joyce published a paper
concluding that there already exists an “international legal obligation to
record civilian casualties of armed conflict.”284 The authors reach this
278
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Casualties of Armed Conflict 1 (June 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
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conclusion by drawing on a broad range of international documents.285 This
paper was published as part of a larger effort to “build the political will to
record details of every single victim of armed conflict worldwide.”286 While
the conclusion reached in the working paper is well argued,287 it remains true
that states are not currently recording civilian war-related deaths in any
systematic way. In September of 2011, The Oxford Research Group
launched the Charter for the Recognition of Every Casualty of Armed
Violence, which urges states and other organizations to commit to the
recording of every casualty of conflict throughout the world.288 This is a
bold and courageous step. The Charter may, one day, give rise to a binding
treaty bringing us closer to realizing the fulfillment of the principle of
distinction and the collateral damage rule; rules that, at the moment, are more
often breached than observed.

www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/1st%20legal%20report%20formatted%20FI
NAL.pdf.
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For the language of the Oxford Research Group Charter, see the following link: http://
www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/other_media/charter.

